Countries with nuclear power plants do not necessarily need to
enrich their own fuel, and most do not. They farm it out, because
of the investment in people and resources, and the economies of
scale. I've heard it said that you would need about 20 plants
in operation to justify the business case.
So it's hard to explain why the Iranians would invest all of this
time and effort in enriching fuel, when they could be investing in the
actual power plants instead. Especially when the Russians were
willing to give them a very good deal on the fuel, and they turned
them down flat.
So far from condemning the Iranians out of hand, it's pretty easy to
come to the conclusion that they want to use this technology to
develop a weapon. Face it, sitting in their geopolitical shoes,
it makes a lot of sense. Countries with nuclear weapons
don't get attacked by rival states (of course, non-state actors like
terrorists are another matter).
And many of us are not inclined to give the Iranians the benefit of
the doubt when they protest to the contrary, given various other public
pronouncements about wiping certain groups off the map. Maybe
it's unfair, but too bad, we're getting way too much craziness
and bluster from these guys.
I would challenge the armchair diplomats out there who are
complaining about the clumsy handling of this issue to suggest
a better approach. Before the US took this on, the Europeans
dithered with it for years, so maybe now it's time for EnviroNet to step
up.
-Joe
-----Original Message-----
From: EnviroNet [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Brian Ellis
Sent: Tuesday, June 20, 2006 4:00 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: [EN] How tomorrow's nuclear power stations will differ from
today's (article)
Perhaps I should have emphasised "with their existing equipment" more.
The present method of enrichment is by centrifuging uranium
hexafluoride, where the gas containing the more fissile isotopes is very
slightly heavier than that with the less fissile ones. However, the
difference is extremely small and enrichment is done by successive
stages in very large batteries of centrifuges. Each stage produces an
enrichment of a minute fraction of 1%. I don't have facts and figures
other than the claims that they have enriched a few g to ~4% in 6 weeks,
presumably with all their centrifuges working 24/7. Extrapolation of
this to >90% enrichment in the kg quantities for weaponry is therefore
easy to see is impossible in a realistic time scale, "with their
existing equipment".
Where the danger lies is that they have succeeded in enrichment to fuel
grade on a virtually laboratory scale, therefore they have the know-how.
Centrifuges are not rocket science and the old, ex-Pakistani,
centrifuges they have could fairly easily be copied and mass-produced.
If they could get hold of more modern ones, then they could be more
efficient and they probably have engineers who could design better ones
from scratch (they are not a technically ignorant people, make no
mistake).
Unfortunately, the West has been so politically clumsy in the way they
have handled the affair (and Bush's speech yesterday to the graduates of
the Merchant Marine College in NY has exacerbated this clumsiness), that
they are actually forcing Iran to back into a corner from which the only
issue is to stubbornly resist any attempts at appeasement.
OK, what does Iran want? They DECLARE (and there is ZERO proof to the
contrary) they wish to pursue the civil use of nuclear technology.
Russia is supplying them with pressurised light water reactors whose
disadvantage is that the fuel needs to be enriched to 4-6%. Russia is
hoping to supply them with such enriched fuel. Iran says, rightly, that
they cannot rely on being able to purchase enriched fuel rods (the
recent natural gas crisis in Ukraine and Europe, shows that Russia
cannot be considered a reliable fuel supplier). They say, again rightly,
that they should be able to enrich their own fuel from commercial yellow
cake, which they could purchase from any country or possibly produce
indigenously. Up to this point, I don't believe that there is any legal
argument that may be applied against Iran and security of supply could
thus be established.
The GWB+henchmen argument is that equipment capable of enriching to 4-6%
is also usable to 90+%, which is true, in theory, but requires scale
which Iran ostensibly does not have - yet. The corollary is that they
have ordered Iran to stop their rightful enrichment (and, consequently,
their security of supply of nuclear fuel) or be sanctioned by the SC.
If, instead, they had told Iran from the start that they could enrich to
4-6% under IAEA supervision, there would be no problem today, but the
henchmen have escalated their position to a refusal of rights,
applicable only to Iran, while many other countries do enrich U. Iran,
obviously, object to this extremely heavy-handed inequality of
treatment. What the henchmen have not understood is the Irani mentality.
They are not blunt Westerners. They are not Arabs. They are a country
with a very ancient scientific and cultural background. I suggest that
the President probably has more brains in his little fingernails than
GWB and Co. have between their ears. He is a master of rhetoric (which
word GWB, RC, TB, DR etc. would probably have to look up in a dictionary
to find the meaning of -- if they can read!), but not just rhetoric as
we know it, but a complex Persian form of rhetoric, which few outside of
the Farsi culture could hope to understand.
There would have been one easy way to resolve the situation, albeit too
late now. If Iran had purchased heavy water reactors, the situation
would probably not have arisen, because enrichment is not necessary. The
downside is that these reactors can be used to produce weapons grade
plutonium, so safeguards to ensure the evacuation of this spent fuel
would have been required, but this is black and white, and not pale
gray, as is enrichment. Another possibility would be an unenriched
pebble-bed reactor, but this is trickier to manage. Either would be much
more expensive in capital costs than a light-water reactor but lower in
running costs (?? for the PBR, as this has not yet been fully
evaluated).
I don't think enrichment by gas diffusion, as used for the Hiroshima
bomb in the 1940s, would even be considered today. The cost and
resources to produce the U-235 were gigantic, over $1billion at 1940's
values. The Los Alamos test in 1945 was the most expensive explosion
ever produced by man and I don't believe Iran could ever afford to go
that route. Another point to consider is that an enriched uranium weapon
is easy to make, with sufficient U-235 to exceed criticality, whereas a
plutonium bomb is much more complex for the chain reaction to be
initiated rapidly enough before the bomb blew apart, otherwise it would
just fizzle.
It is difficult, now, to know what Iran's intentions are. The West has
found them guilty before the crime, which has closed the gates to
negotiation. We did not learn from the WMD fiasco in Iraq and we are all
too keen to assume the worst, without real cause. I am not saying that
Iran is innocent and faultless, but I do not like the way thay are being
forced into a corner.
Brian
Charles Dolci wrote:
> Brian Ellis wrote, in part:
> "...Yes, if it has taken them 6 weeks to enrich 3 or 4 g to 4% with
> their existing equipment, it would take them many decades to enrich
> sufficient U to sustain an uncontrolled chain reaction (i.e. a bomb)."
>
> I am no scientist so I am in no position to debate Brian on the
> scientific basis of his assertion about Iran's ability to make nuclear
> weapons. However, I am an historian and I do recall that the US was
able
> to develop two kinds of nuclear weapons (one plutonium and one uranium
> based) in just four years, starting from scratch. Not only did the US
> and its British cohorts have to prove concepts they also had to
overcome
> the engineering issues associated with all aspects of nuclear weapon
> development. And they were using technology and tools that, today, are
> at least 65 years old.
>
> Just why will it take Iran "decades" to develop a nuclear weapon, when
> the US and Britain were able to do it all in just 4 years, 65 years
ago?
> Are they that stupid? Do they lack the resources? ... the resolve?
>
> After the US dropped the bomb on Hiroshima Werenr Heisenberg, one of
the
> top German/Nazi scientists who had worked on the German nuclear
program,
> and many of his colleagues, were initially skeptical that the
Hiroshima
> bomb was really a nuclear weapon. He was convinced that the Americans
> could not have possibly developed, in such a short time, enough
> fissionable material for one bomb, much less two. The fact is the US
had
> the ability to drop many more A-bombs. A third bomb was being
assembled
> and could have been dropped as early as August 17 or 18 (the first was
> dropped on August 6). Many more were scheduled for completion over the
> following weeks. History is replete with instances of someone
> underestimating the abilities of their enemies, much to their mortal
> danger.
>
> Even if Brian is right, I don't get a lot of comfort from the claim
that
> Iran may have nuclear weapons after ten or so years.
>
> Chuck Dolci
>
--
http://www.cypenv.org Cyprus environment/energy
http://www.cypenv.org/worldenv World environment/energy
http://www.cypenv.org/weather Cyprus weather
http://www.cypenv.org/smf/index.php Environment/energy forums
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/cypnature/ Cyprus nature forum
|
